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ABSTRACT
Active Inference (AIF) is an emerging framework in the brain sciences which suggests that biolog-
ical agents act to minimise a variational bound on model evidence. Control-as-Inference (CAI) is
a framework within reinforcement learning which casts decision making as a variational inference
problem. While these frameworks both consider action selection through the lens of variational in-
ference, their relationship remains unclear. Here, we provide a formal comparison between them
and demonstrate that the primary difference arises from how value is incorporated into their respec-
tive generative models. In the context of this comparison, we highlight several ways in which these
frameworks can inform one another.
1 Introduction
Active Inference (AIF) is an emerging theory in computational and theoretical neuroscience which posits a uni-
fied theory of inference, learning, and control in the brain (K. Friston, 2008; K. Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006;
K. J. Friston, Daunizeau, & Kiebel, 2009). Core to this theory is the idea that neural dynamics can be cast as imple-
menting variational inference on a free energy functional (K. Friston, 2010; K. J. Friston, Parr, & de Vries, 2017). In
discrete-state-spaces such a process has been shown to produce purported neural dynamics with a high degree of bio-
logical plausibility, which can reproduce empirically observed effects such as mismatch-negativity, oscillations, phase-
precession, repetition-suppression and violation-responses(K. Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo,
2017; Parr, Markovic, Kiebel, & Friston, 2019). Moreover, although initially implemented on small, discrete state-
spaces, a recent body of work has contended and largely succeeded at scaling up active-inference to handle tasks
comparable to modern reinforcement learning methods (Fountas, Sajid, Mediano, & Friston, 2020; Millidge, 2019,?;
Tschantz, Baltieri, Seth, Buckley, et al., 2019; Tschantz, Millidge, Seth, & Buckley, 2020; Ueltzho¨ffer, 2018). Central
to active inference is the idea that control – or action – is fundamentally a process of inference, underwritten by the
same processes that perform perceptual inference and learning. Actions are just another random variable to be inferred,
along with unknown hidden states of the world (perception) (K. Friston et al., 2015).
Reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton & Barto, 2018) is a field in machine learning also dedicated to the problem
of control. In RL, the problem setup is that an agent must maximize the expected sum of rewards it obtains over
some time horizon (which may be infinite) in an unknown environment represented as a Markov-Decision-Process
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(MDP) or Partially-Observed MDP (POMDP). This problem formulation is extremely flexible and it has allowed ma-
chine learning to tackle extremely challenging tasks such as world-class game-playing (Badia et al., 2020; Mnih et al.,
2015; Silver et al., 2017) and robot locomotion and navigation (Lillicrap et al., 2015). The Control as Inference (CAI)
framework (Attias, 2003; Levine, 2018; Rawlik, Toussaint, & Vijayakumar, 2013; Toussaint, 2009) within RL casts
the reward maximization objective as one of inference within an augmented probabilistic graphical model (PGM). By
converting reward maximization into an inference objective, CAI enables the use of a powerful suite of inference algo-
rithms to be applied directly to the RL problem. Moreover, CAI provides a natural method for the quantification and
optimal handling of uncertainty within the RL problem, while also prescribing strategies for both regularisation, and
exploration(Haarnoja, Zhou, Abbeel, & Levine, 2018; Haarnoja, Zhou, Hartikainen, et al., 2018; Hessel et al., 2018).
Although they developed largely independently, both AIF and CAI fundamentally view the control problem through
the lens of variational inference on a probabilistic graphical model. However, despite the close similarities, the exact
relationship between the two formalisms remains unclear. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on this relation.
We show that in their ‘native’ formulation, CAI and AIF differ in three crucial ways. Firstly, they differ in what
is optimized. CAI learns a policy, or a direct state-action mapping, while AIF instead infers fixed action-sequences
(which are called policies in the AIF literature). Second, AIF is naturally setup to handle POMDP environments,
where only observations are given while the underlying (Markovian) state is not, while CAI is originally formulated
to handle only MDP settings where the true state is directly given to the agent. Thirdly, the formalisms differ in the
way they encode goals and rewards into the inference framework. Due to the flexibility of the variational framework,
we show how the first two differences can be overcome by making principled extensions to CAI, AIF, or both. To do
so, we extend the CAI framework to handle both POMDP settings, which are native to AIF, and also to be able to infer
fixed-length action sequences instead of its natural mode of policies. Conversely, we show how AIF can be adapted
to directly learn an amortised policy. Only the third difference of how rewards or desires are encoded proves to be an
insuperable obstacle to the unification of the two theories, and we argue that it is thus the key distinction that separates
them and is a core philosophical point of contention. We showcase how this key underlying distinction leads to subtle
mathematical differences in the objective functionals that both schemes optimize, and suggest how these differences
may impact behaviour.
2 Formalism
Both CAI and AIF are inference schemes that take place on Markov-Decision-Processes (MDP)s, whether par-
tially observed or not. We consider the partially observed case (POMDP) here. A POMDP is defined as a
tO,S,A, penvpo|sq, penvpst|st´1, at´1q, ru, where a P A denotes actions and s P S denotes states, and o P O de-
notes observations. The agent only has access to observations o and must infer the correct hidden states s from the
history of observations. States are Markov such that the state st only depends on the previous state st´1 and action
at´1. Observations are not necessarily Markov. State transitions are governed by st`1 „ penvpst`1|st, atq, and states
emit rewards govenerd by ot „ penvpo|sq. r : S ˆ A Ñ R
1 is a reward function which takes a state-action pair and
returns a scalar reward value. Both CAI and AIF view states s P S and actions a P A as random variables whose value
is to be inferred given rewards r P R1 and observations o P O. Simply performing inference on this setup will not,
however, result in adaptive behaviour because it has no notion of intrinsic rewards or goals. ”Reward” is just a variable
like any other. Instead some additional assumptions are required to bias inference towards inferring actions that lead
to highly rewarding or desirable states (in the long run). It is this problem of encoding goals into the inference process
that is the fundamental difference between CAI and AIF.
2.1 Control as Inference
CAI implements reward-biased inference by augmenting the POMDP setup with additional ‘optimality’ variables Ot
which encode the probability that a given action was ‘optimal’ in terms of long run reward. The idea is rather than
simply inferring the value-free posterior ppst, at|otq, we instead infer the optimal posterior ppst, at|ot,Ot:T q. To infer
this posterior we can utilize a process of variational inference whereby instead of directly inferring the posterior we
instead optimize the variational lower bound.
Lpφq “ DKL
´
qφpst, atq}ppOt,ot, st, atq
¯
ď DKL
´
qφpst, atq}pp, st, at|Ot,otq
¯
(1)
Here we have postulated a variational distribution qφpat, stq which is under the control of the agent and parametrised
by φ. Note: the CAI variational bound1 Lpφq “ ´F is the negative variational free-energy functional which is
optimized by AIF. It is also assumed that the CAI agent also possesses a generative model ppOt,ot, st, atq “
1often called the Evidence-Lower-Bound (ELBO)
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ppOt|st, atqppo|stqppat|stqppst|st´1, at´1q. This generative model encodes the dependencies encoded in the aug-
mented POMDP graphical model. The formulation of CAI presented here extends that traditionally in the literature
(Levine, 2018) because we have extended CAI to the POMDPs natively handled by AIF. This corresponds to an adding
observations, o, to the generative model. Using our definitions of the variational density and the generative model, we
can derive the following CAI variational bound.
Lpφq “ DKL
´
qφpst, atq}ppOt,ot, st, atq
¯
“ DKL
´
qφpat, stqqpstq}ppOt|st, atqppot|stqppat|stqppst|st´1, at´1q
¯
“ ´Eqφpst,atq
“
ln ppOt|st, atq
‰
loooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooon
Extrinsic Value
`DKL
´
qpstq}ppst|st´1, at´1q
¯
looooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
State divergence
`DKL
´
qφpat|stq}ppat|stq
¯
looooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
Action Divergence
´Eqφpat,stq
“
ln ppot|stq
‰
loooooooooooomoooooooooooon
Observation Ambiguity
(2)
Which can be decomposed into four terms. The first ”extrinsic value” term denotes how much the agent values a
given state according to the externally given reward information. In the CAI literature the optimality variable in
the extrinsic reward is often defined as ppOt|st, atq :“ e
rpst,atq so that the log optimality is directly the reward
ln ppOt|st, atq “ rpst, atq. The state and action divergence terms penalizes the CAI agent for how much its actions
and dynamics diverge from its priors. In the CAI formalism, the variational and generative dynamics are often fixed
to be the same qpstq :“ ppst|st´1, at´1q so that the agent does not believe it has control over the dynamics of the
world except through action 2. This eliminates the second term from the bound. Under the assumption that the action
prior is uniform ppat|stq :“
1
|A| the action divergence merely becomes an action entropy which is often found in
the literature to produce a superior exploration strategy than simple ǫ-greedy and Boltzmann exploration strategies
(Haarnoja, Zhou, Abbeel, & Levine, 2018). The fourth term, the observation ambiguity is novel to extension of CAI
to POMDPs. It encourages the CAI agent to seek out observations with a highly precise expected mapping from states
– i.e. observations for which the state-observation mapping is easy to invert.
2.2 Active Inference
Unlike CAI which performs inference over a PGM augmentedwith optimality variables, AIF instead assumes the PGM
contains a biased distribution over rewards p˜potq. AIF then performs inference as usual with this biased distribution.
In effect, AIF biases inference by encoding goals and desires directly into the generative model (typically priors
and likelihoods) while CAI maintains veridicial priors but instead biases inference through the use of exogenous
”bias” optimality variables. A second key difference from CAI is that AIF typically optimizes fixed-action-plans
π :“ ta1, a2 . . . aNu which are called ‘policies’ in the active inference literature. To avoid confusion with the RL
literature we call state-action mappings ‘policies’, and series of actions ‘plans’. In AIF we optimize a variational
bound over a full trajectory. Moreover, developing prospective plans involves future states and observations it is
necessary its minimize the expected free energy rather than the instantaneous variational free energy 3. It is possible
to derive an analytical expression for the optimal plan in terms of the sum of individual expected free energies Fpπqt
for each timestep.
´Fpπq “ Eqpot:T ,st:T ,piq
´
qpst:T , πq}p˜pot:T , st:T , πq
¯
“ Eqpot:T ,st:T |piqqppiq
´
qpst:T |πqqpπq}p˜pot:T , st:T |πqppπq
¯
“ Eqppiq
”
DKL
´
qpπq}ppπq
Tÿ
t
Eqpot,stq
“
qpst|πq ´ p˜pot, st|πq
‰¯ı
“ Eqppiq
”
DKL
´
qpπq}ppπq
Tÿ
t
´Fpπqt
¯ı
ùñ q˚pπq “ σpln ppπq ´
Tÿ
t
Fpπqtq (3)
Where σ is the softmax function. This derivation assumes the Markov factorisation of the generative model and a
temporal mean-field approximation on the variational density qpst:T |πq “
śT
t qpst|πq. Since the optimal posterior
over plans can be expressed as a Boltzmann distribution over the sum of expected-free-energies for each timestep in
the trajectory, weighted by the expected prior plan probability, the key determinants to behaviour, assuming a relatively
2Not making this assumption effectively means that the agent believes it it free to arbitrarily alter the environmental dynamics
albeit with a penalty cost proportional to their divergence from the true dynamics. Since the agent cannot do this in reality, this
naturally leads to risk-seeking policies. See Levine (2018) for more details
3Although other objective functionals are also possible (Millidge, Tschantz, & Buckley, 2020)
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mild prior over plans, is the behaviour of the expected free energy (EFE) functional. The EFE can be written as:
´Fpπqt “ ´Eqpot,stq
“
ln qpstq ´ ln p˜pot, stq
‰
“ Eqpot,stq
“
ln qpstq ´ ln p˜pst|otq ´ ln p˜potq
‰
“ Eqpot,stq
“
ln p˜poq
‰
looooooooomooooooooon
Extrinsic Value
´Eqpotq
“
DKL
´
qpst|otq}qpstq
¯‰
loooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooon
Intrinsic Value
(4)
Where here we make the assumption that the variational inference procedure is approximately correct such that
p˜pst|otq « qpst|otq. Active inference agents overall seek to maximize both expected reward (under the standard
definition, akin to that for CAI, i.e., ln p˜poq9erpotq) while also maximizing their intrinsic value which is a state-
information gain and compels agentd to seek out novel environmental contingencies. It is important to note that this
is a more powerful form of exploration than the action entropy present in the CAI objective function. Information
gain explicitly drives the agent to explore regions which it has little information about, thus inducing goal-directed
exploration. Action-entropy, on the other hand, simply maximizes the entropy of the optimal policy, thus inducing
only random exploration(Houthooft et al., 2016; Levine, 2018; Shyam, Jas´kowski, & Gomez, 2018). In theory, goal-
directed exploration is substantially more sample-efficient since it can proactively seek out novel contingencies instead
of simply stumbling upon them through a random-walk.
Despite the fact that both CAI and AIF emerge from casting the problem of adaptive action as variational inference,
the resulting formalisms look very different. In the next section, we will show that many of these difference can be
reconciled by formulating active-inference in terms of policies rather than plans, and conversely reformulating the CAI
framework to infer plans rather than policies. This leaves one irreducible difference in terms of how goals are encoded
in each respective framework.
2.3 Inferring policies through Active Inference
Here we reformulate AIF to instead infer a policy – i.e. a state-action mapping for each time-step, instead of a plan,
to maximize the similarity with control as inference. Such a reformulation is relatively straightforward, it requires
adding action variables to the EFE, and inferring the parameters φ of some parametrised policy qφpat|stq.
´Fpφqt “ Eqpot,st,atq
“
ln qφpat, stq ´ ln p˜pat, st,otq
‰
“ Eqpot,st,atq
“
ln qφpat|stq ` ln qpstq ´ ln p˜potq ´ ln p˜pst|otq ´ ln ppat|stq
‰
“ ´Eqpotq
“
ln p˜potq
‰
loooooooomoooooooon
Extrinsic Value
´Eqpotq
“
DKL
´
qpst|otq}qpstq
¯‰
loooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooon
Intrinsic Value
`Eqpst
“
DKL
´
qφpat|stq}ppat|stq
¯‰
loooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooon
Action Divergence
(5)
Comparing this functional to that in Equation 4, we see that adding actions as a random variable to the variational
bound obtains an identical action divergence term to that seen in CAI. However, there are still substantial differences
between the functionals. First the AIF formalism does not produce the same observation-ambiguity term present
in the CAI objective (see Equation 2). This is due to the fact that CAI maintains a separation between veridicial
observations and the optimality variables which encodes reward, while AIF collapses this distinction into one notion
of biased observations. In effect, in the AIF functional the observation ambiguity term has been ‘hijacked’ by biasing
the generative model with reward and has been instead converted to an extrinsic value term. A second difference, and
one that underwrites substantial differences in behaviour is between the intrinsic value, or state divergence term of
AIF vs CAI. In AIF, this term is an intrinsic value or an expected information gain, which tells the agent to maximize
the difference between its prior and posterior beliefs. In contrast, in the CAI objective this term tells the agent to
minimize this divergence. This change in perspective fundamentally originates from the manner in which rewards are
encoded into the generative model, as a prior over biased observations, and from the subsequent decomposition into a
biased prior and posterior in AIF whereas in CAI the extrinsic value is effectively encoded into the likelihood which,
by Bayes rule, relates to the prior as ppo|sq “ ppoq ppsq
pps|oq where this latter fraction becomes an negative information
gain when Bayes rule is applied within a KL divergence. This difference can be seen straightforwardly by modelling
a further variant of active inference, which here we call likelihood-AIF, where instead of a biased prior over rewards
the agent has a biased likelihood p˜pot, stq “ p˜pot|stqppstq. The objective functional for likelihood-AIF Fˆpφq can be
written as:
Fˆpφq “ Eqφpst,ot,atq
“
ln qφpst, atq ´ ln p˜pot, st, atq
‰
“ Eqφpst,ot,atq
“
ln qpstq ` ln qφpat|stq ´ ln p˜pot|stq ´ ln ppat|stq ´ ln ppstq
‰
“ ´Eqφpst,atq
“
ln p˜pot|stq
‰
loooooooooooooomoooooooooooooon
Extrinsic Value
`DKL
´
qpstq}ppst|st´1, at´1q
¯
looooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
State divergence
`DKL
´
qφpat|stq}ppat|stq
¯
looooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
Action Divergence
(6)
which, under the assumption that ln p˜pot|stq “ ln ppOt|st, atq, is exactly equivalent to the CAI objective for MDPs.
The fact that likelihood-AIF on POMDPs is equivalent to CAI on MDPs is due to the fact that the observation modality
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in AIF is ‘hijacked’ by the biased encoding of goals, and thus effectively contains one less degree-of-freedom than
CAI which maintains a separate veridicial representation of observation likelihoods. A further connection is that AIF
on MDPs is equivalent to KL control (Rawlik, Toussaint, & Vijayakumar, 2010; Rawlik et al., 2013), and the recently
proposed state-marginal-matching (Lee et al., 2019) objectives. Next, we consider the converse option and formulate
a novel CAI model that infers full plans instead of policies, and show how the exact same conclusions apply to this
formulation.
2.4 Planning with Control as Inference
Here we reformulate the standard CAI approach to instead infer fixed action plans π, and showcase again how it is the
difference in how rewards are encoded in each formalisms which underpins the most significant difference between
CAI and AIF. Specifically, We derive a novel variational planning bound for CAI and show that it can be used to derive
an expression for the optimal plan in terms of a sum of original variational lower-bounds. In what follows, the optimal
policy is derived from the planning-variational-bound.
L “ DKL
´
qpst:T , πq}ppOt:T ,ot:T , st:T , πq
¯
ď DKL
´
qpst:T , πq}ppot:T , st:T , π|Ot:T q
¯
“ DKL
´
qpst:T |πqqpπq}ppOt:T ,ot:T , st:T |πqppπq
¯
“ DKL
´
qpπq}ppπqDKL
“
qpst:T q}ppOt:T ,ot:T , st:T |πq
‰¯
“ DKL
´
qpπq}ppπq `
Tÿ
t
Lpπqt
‰¯
ùñ q˚pπq “ σpppπq ´
Tÿ
t
Lpπqtq (7)
Since, as before, the optimal policy corresponds to a path-integral of the individual CAI variational bounds over
a trajectory, to understand the effect of this planning algorithm on behaviour, we must study the makeup of these
bounds. Decomposing the bound, we obtain.
Lpπqt “ Eqpst|piq
“
ln qpstq ´ ln ppOt,ot, stqs “ Eqpstq
“
ln qpst|πq ´ ln ppOt|st, πq ´ ln ppot|stq ´ ln ppst|st´1, πq
‰
“ ´Eqpst|piq
“
ln ppOt|st, πq
‰
looooooooooooomooooooooooooon
Extrinsic Value
`DKL
´
qpst|πq}ppst|st´1, πq
¯
looooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
State divergence
´Eqpst|piq
“
ln ppot|stq
‰
looooooooooomooooooooooon
Observation Ambiguity
(8)
Here again we see that we obtain a observation-ambiguity term which is lacking in the AIF formulation, which is again
due to the fact that AIF directly encodes goals into the observations thus removing this degree of freedom. Moreover,
when comparing this functional to the original AIF functional (Equation 4), we observe that the same relation holds
as in the case of policies (Equation 5) and CAI yields extrinsic value involving a likelhood and an information gain
term which is minimized, while AIF obtains extrinsic value involving only the prior and an information gain term to be
maximized. This difference is fundamentally due to the different means of encoding desires into the generative model.
An AIF approach which encoded its goals directly into the likelihood function == i.e., p˜pot, stq “ p˜pot|stqppstq and
which inferred plans would be identical to a planning-CAI method on an MDP.
3 Discussion
In this paper we have shown that Active Inference and Control as Inference, although closely related differ in two key
ways. The first, which is not fundamental, is simply that active inference was originally formulated to infer plans while
control as inference primarily infers policies. Nevertheless, as we do here, it is straightforward to reformulate each
theory in terms of policies or plans. A deeper and more fundamental difference lies in the way each theory encodes
goals and thus turns a value-free inference problem into one that can serve the purposes of adaptive action. CAI does
this through augmenting the ‘natural’ probabilistic graphical model with exogenous optimality variables 4. Active
inference, on the other hand, while leaving the graphical model structure unaltered, directly encodes its desires into
the generative model itself. These two methods for encoding goals lead to distinct differences between the functionals
optimised under CAI compared to under AIF. Active Inference, due to contaminating the veridicial generative model
with value-imbuing biases, loses a degree of freedom compared to CAI which maintains a strict separation between the
veridicial generative model of the environment and its goals. When implemented in POMDPs, this approach results in
CAI being sensitive to an additional ‘observation-ambiguity’ term which is absent in the AIF formulation. Secondly
4This is not strictly necessary and instead in the case of undirected graphical models, an additional undirected factor can be
added to each node (Ziebart, 2010). Interestingly, this is extremely similar to the procedure adopted in Parr and Friston (2019),
suggesting that the generalised free energy itself is equivalent to control as inference.
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the different methods for encoding the probability of goals – using likelihoods in CAI and priors in AIF – lead to
different exploratory terms in the objective functionals. Specifically, AIF is endowed with an exploratory intrinsic
value, which induces active inference agents to continually seek out novel contingencies, which CAI lacks. In this
way, AIF approaches lend themselves naturally to goal-directed exploration whereas control-as-inference mandates
only random, entropy-maximizing exploration strategies.
These differences in the ways goals are encoded into probabilistic models also lend themselves to deeper, more philo-
sophical interpretations. Control-as-Inference, by postulating goals as an additional exogenous factor in an other-
wise unbiased inference process, maintains a clean separation between veridicial perception and control, keeping the
modularity thesis of separate perception and action modules (Baltieri & Buckley, 2018) intact. This makes control-
as-inference approaches deeply consonant with the mainstream view in machine learning which sees the goal of
perception as maintaining true representations of the world, and the goal of control is taking this world model and
then using it to plan actions given an unbiased assessment of their consequences. Active-inference, by contrast,
elides these clean boundaries between unbiased perception and action by instead positing that biased perception
(Tschantz, Seth, & Buckley, 2020) is crucial to adaptive action. Rather than maintaining an unbiased world-model
which predicts likely consequences, we instead maintain a biased generative model which preferentially predicts our
preferences being fulfilled, and then we act so as to bring these predictions true. In this way, active-inference aligns
closely with enactive and embodied approaches (Baltieri & Buckley, 2019; Clark, 2015) to cognition, which view the
action-perception loop as a continual flow rather than a sequence of distinct stages.
In this work, we have seen how two means of encoding preferences into inference problems leads to two separate
theories and families of algorithms, each optimising subtly different functionals which results in differing behaviour.
This raises the natural question of whether one method of encoding preferences is better than another, and indeed
whether these two approaches presented here are the only two, or whether there are other methods as well. It is
possible, for instance, to imagine explicitly modelling the reward an agent expects to receive, and biasing inferences
with priors over the reward. Or, alternatively, agents couldmaintain desired distributions over all of states, observations,
and actions, which would maximize the flexibility in specifying goals intrinsic to the framework. While fascinating,
these potential extensions to the framework, where they sit in relation to one-another, and the objective functionals
they induce, are a topic for future work.
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